By Bolanle Mojeed
In recent years, Nigeria has quietly emerged as one of Africa’s largest investors in surveillance technology. Framed publicly as necessary tools for national security, crime prevention, and counterterrorism, these systems have sparked increasing debate among civil society groups, journalists, and digital rights advocates. Investigations by academic institutions, media organizations, and policy researchers suggest that the Nigerian government has built a sophisticated and expanding surveillance architecture – one that operates across telecommunications networks, internet platforms, biometric databases, and public spaces.
When former Kaduna State governor Nasir El-Rufai publicly accused the Federal Government of illegally spying on Nigerian citizens, the allegation reignited a long-running national debate: How far has the Nigerian state gone in building a digital surveillance system – and are legal safeguards keeping pace?
El-Rufai’s claims, which suggested the misuse of security and cyber laws to monitor critics and political opponents, did not emerge in isolation. They came against a backdrop of documented procurement of interception tools, biometric identity integration, social media monitoring capacity, and controversial enforcement of cybercrime legislation.
This report examines the evidence, structure, scope, and implications of Nigeria’s surveillance ecosystem, drawing on documented case studies and verified research findings that together form what critics increasingly describe as Nigeria’s expanding surveillance state.
Billions Spent on Surveillance Infrastructure
A study by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), United Kingdom, published in 2023, found that Nigeria spent approximately $2.7 billion between 2013 and 2022 on surveillance technologies – more than any other African country studied during that period. According to IDS researchers, this figure includes contracts for lawful interception systems, public CCTV infrastructure, biometric data systems, and digital monitoring platforms.
The IDS report, titled “African Nations Spending $1bn a Year on Harmful Surveillance of Citizens”, indicates that Nigeria accounted for a significant share of Africa’s estimated $1 billion annual spending on surveillance technologies. The study further notes that these technologies were supplied by firms based in China, Israel, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.
Among the most prominent suppliers identified were Chinese technology giants Huawei and ZTE, both linked to “Safe City” surveillance projects in major Nigerian urban centers.
Telecom Interception and Call Monitoring
A 2016 investigation by Citizen Lab, based at the University of Toronto, revealed that Nigeria’s Defence Intelligence Agency had acquired advanced interception systems capable of monitoring phone calls and SMS messages.
The Citizen Lab report detailed the acquisition of equipment from Israeli surveillance vendor Circles, which exploits vulnerabilities in the global SS7 telecom protocol. SS7 weaknesses allow actors with access to telecommunications infrastructure to intercept calls and track users’ locations without installing spyware on their devices.
Subsequent reporting by International Centre for Investigative Reporting (ICIR) confirmed procurement of lawful interception technology capable of monitoring citizens’ communications.
In 2021, Daily Trust reported that Nigerian police used telecommunications metadata to track and lure journalists into arrest. According to the investigation, officers obtained call detail records (CDRs) from telecom providers to identify sources and contacts of investigative reporters.
In some cases, law enforcement officials allegedly displayed journalists’ private call logs during interrogations as proof of surveillance capability. Press freedom groups described the practice as a violation of constitutional protections under Section 39 of the Nigerian Constitution, which guarantees freedom of expression and the press.
Digital rights advocates have long warned that government interest in online spaces extends beyond counterterrorism.
Criminalizing Dissent
Central to current concerns is the application of Nigeria’s cyber legislation – particularly the Cybercrime Act (officially the Cybercrime (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015).
Originally enacted to combat fraud, identity theft, and online scams, Section 24 of the Act criminalizes sending “offensive,” “annoying,” or “insulting” messages via computer networks. Critics argue that this broadly worded provision – often described in public debate as a “cyberbullying clause” – has been used to arrest citizens for social media criticism of public officials.
Human rights organizations, including Paradigm Initiative, have documented multiple cases in which journalists, bloggers, and private citizens were detained under Section 24 after publishing posts critical of political figures.
Legal scholars argue that the vague language of “annoyance” and “insult” creates a chilling effect on free speech. In practice, law enforcement agencies may seek digital records – IP addresses, phone metadata, and device information – during investigations under the Act, effectively expanding state monitoring powers.
While government officials have publicly denied broad monitoring of citizens’ social media activities, procurement documents cited by journalists suggest investments in systems capable of deep packet inspection (DPI) – a technology that enables detailed tracking of internet usage.
Biometric Surveillance
The National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) manages Nigeria’s centralized National Identification Number (NIN) database, containing biometric information such as fingerprints and facial data.
Government policies mandating the linkage of SIM cards to NIN records significantly expanded the state’s ability to connect telecommunications activity to verified personal identities. The exercise, supervised by the Nigerian Communications Commission, was presented as a national security measure aimed at combating kidnapping and banditry.
Critics argue that, without robust oversight and independent judicial authorization for access, such databases could facilitate large-scale tracking of individuals’ communications and movements.
“Safe City”
In major Nigerian cities, large-scale CCTV deployments have been rolled out under “Safe City” initiatives. Contracts awarded to Huawei and other firms included facial recognition-enabled cameras, license plate recognition systems, and centralized monitoring centers. Although official evaluations of effectiveness remain limited, these systems theoretically allow authorities to identify individuals in public spaces in real time.
Urban security experts note that while such systems are common globally, their use in environments with weak oversight mechanisms raises civil liberties concerns.
Legal/Regulatory Challenges
Nigeria established the Nigeria Data Protection Commission (NDPC) in 2023 to strengthen privacy regulation. However, digital rights organizations argue that enforcement capacity remains limited.
According to report by Foundation for Investigative Journalism (FIJ), a proposed Electronic Surveillance and Communications Privacy Bill – intended to regulate interception procedures and require judicial warrants – has not yet been stalled.
Section 37 of the Nigerian Constitution guarantees citizens’ right to privacy, including correspondence and telecommunications. Yet legal experts note that intelligence agencies operate under broad national security mandates that are often shielded from public scrutiny.
Nigeria’s surveillance expansion reflects a broader global trend in which governments adopt increasingly sophisticated digital monitoring tools. However, researchers emphasize that technology itself is not inherently repressive; rather, its impact depends on governance structures, transparency, and accountability.
For Nigeria – a faltering democracy, the stakes are particularly high. Surveillance tools designed for counterterrorism can easily intersect with political dissent, journalism, and civic activism if not tightly regulated.
As the IDS report concluded, the key issue is not whether surveillance exists, but whether Nigeria’s surveillance capacity expansion has adequately secured Nigerians.
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